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I. INTRODUCTION
The articles in this Symposium Issue of the University of Miami
Law Review are based on presentations made by the authors at the First
Annual Institute on Mergers and Acquisitions, sponsored by the Univer-
sity of Miami School of Law on February 6-7, 1997. The Institute was
Co-Chaired by Harvey Goldman of Steel, Hector and Davis LLP,
Miami, Florida and Dennis S. Hersch, the head of the mergers and
acquisitions practice at Davis Polk & Wardwell, New York. The speak-
ers at the Institute included some of the leading lawyers, government
officials, and judges working in the area of mergers and acquisitions.
This Article provides a guide to various issues that can arise in
mergers and acquisitions and discusses the manner in which the articles
in this Symposium fit into the guide. This Article also provides refer-
ences to some of the vast literature addressing merger and acquisition
issues.I
Except in a stock acquisition of a closely-held target, where the
acquirer deals directly with the target's shareholders,2 the acquirer will
1. This guide is based in part on the approach to mergers and acquisitions taken in SAMUEL
C. THOMPSON, JR., BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (1997) [hereinafter
THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A]. See also Lou R. KLING & EILEEN NUGENT SIMON,
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS (1996) [hereinafter
KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS]; MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS (1995) [hereinafter LIPTON, TAKEOVERS]. For a similar approach to the one taken
here see Bernard Kury, Acquisition Checklist, 36 Bus. LAW. 207 (1981).
2. This Article does not specifically address issues that can arise in stock acquisitions of
closely-held corporations. However, this topic is covered in detail in Section of Business Law,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY (1995)
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have to give consideration to approaching a potential target's directors.
This is true even if the acquirer proceeds with a hostile tender offer,
because the target's directors may undertake defensive measures. Thus,
particularly in the acquisition of a publicly-held target, the target's direc-
tors will play a large role in the transaction, whether it be a negotiated
transaction or hostile takeover, and early in the acquisition, process the
acquirer will have to consider the potential reaction of the target's
directors.
Section II, therefore, addresses the law governing the target's direc-
tors in negotiated and hostile acquisitions. This is a hot topic, and vari-
ous aspects of the topic are addressed in five articles in this Symposium.
First, Melvin Eisenberg (the Koret Professor of Law at the University of
California at Berkeley, the author of one of the leading corporations
casebooks, and the Chief Reporter of the ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance3 ) addresses the role of a target's directors in negotiated
acquisitions in his article entitled The Director's Duty of Care in Negoti-
ated Dispositions.4
Second, John Coffee, a professor at Columbia University Law
School and the author of leading casebooks on corporations and securi-
ties regulations, addresses the role of institutional investors in curtailing
the control a target's directors have over the acquisition process. Profes-
sor Coffee's article is entitled The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions
Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests.5
Third, Dennis Block (a partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
and co-author of a leading treatise dealing with the business judgment
rule6) and two of his colleagues address the role of a target's directors in
implementing defensive tactics and survey the various defensive tactics
available.7 Their article is entitled Defensive Measures in Anticipation
[hereinafter MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT]. See also KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS
supra note 1, at § 1.03[I]; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at chs. I I
(stock acquisitions), 12 (asset acquisitions).
3. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (1994) [hereinafter ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE]. For a
discussion of the provisions of these principles addressing mergers and acquisitions see Samuel C.
Thompson, Jr., The Merger and Acquisition Provisions of the ALI Corporate Governance Project
as Applied to the Three Steps in the Time- Warner Acquisition, 2 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 145 (1994)
[hereinafter Thompson, ALI Principles].
4. Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Director's Duty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 579 (1997) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Duty of Care].
5. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the Outcome of
Corporate Control Contests?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 605 (1997) [hereinafter Coffee, Bylaw
Battlefield].
6. DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (4th Ed. 1993, Supp 1995).
7. See generally ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE
(5th Ed. 1995).
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of and in Response to Unsolicited Takeover Proposals.' Fourth, Dan
Neff, a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz, addresses the
impact of state takeover statutes on directors' fiduciary duties and exam-
ines the legality of continuing director provisions of shareholder rights
plans (poison pills) in his article entitled The Impact of State Statutes
and Continuing Director Rights Plans.9
In the final article addressing the law governing a target's directors,
Vince Garrity and Mark Morton of Duane, Morris & Heckscher (Vince
is the Chairman of the Negotiated Acquisitions Committee of the ABA
Section of Business Law) address the use of various types of lock-up
provisions under Pennsylvania and Delaware law in their article entitled
Would the CSX/Conrail Express Have Derailed in Delaware? A Com-
parative Analysis of Lock-Up Provisions Under Delaware and Penn-
sylvania Law."0
At the Institute, Vice Chancellor Jack B. Jacobs of the Delaware
Court of Chancery provided comments regarding directors' duties in
both negotiated and hostile transactions.
The boards of both the acquirer and the target will generally have to
make a judgment about the value of the target at an early stage in the
acquisition process, and this topic is addressed in Section III. Although
this Symposium does not contain an article addressing valuation, the
topic was covered at the Institute by Bob Lovejoy, a Managing Director
of Lazard Fr~res & Co. LLC.
The most desirable target may operate in the same line of business
as the acquirer, and this could give rise to a potential antitrust challenge
to the transaction. Thus, before proceeding with an acquisition a well-
advised acquirer will attempt to determine whether the transaction is
likely to be challenged on antitrust grounds. Also, the parties must
determine whether the transaction will be subject to pre-merger notifica-
tion under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Although this Symposium does
not contain an article dealing with the antitrust or pre-merger notifica-
tion aspects of mergers and acquisitions, a presentation on this topic was
made at the Institute by Mark Whitener, the Deputy Director of the
Bureau of Competition at the FTC, and Section IV contains a short
8. Dennis J. Block et al., Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in Response to
Unsolicited Takeover Proposals, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 623 (1997) [hereinafter Block, Defensive
Measures]. Dennis Hersch, co-chair of the Institute, substituted for Mr. Block at the Institute.
9. Daniel A. Neff, The Impact of State Statutes and Continuing Director Rights Plans, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 663 (1997) [hereinafter Neff, State Statutes].
10. Vincent F. Garrity, Jr. & Mark A. Morton, Would the CSX/Conrail Express Have
Derailed in Delaware? A Comparative Analysis of Lock-Up Provisions Under Delaware and
Pennsylvania Law, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 677 (1997) [hereinafter Garrity, The CSX/Conrail
Express].
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introduction to antitrust analysis in mergers and acquisition and to pre-
merger notification.
Once a target has been identified, the acquirer must determine
whether it is going to attempt to effectuate a negotiated acquisition or a
hostile takeover. If the target is closely-held, a negotiated acquisition is
practically the only way to complete the transaction. However, if the
target is publicly-held, the transaction may be effectuated by a negoti-
ated transaction or a hostile tender offer followed by a freeze-out
merger. Thus, the acquirer has many different options available to it in
structuring the acquisition.
Section V briefly addresses some of the state corporate law issues
that can arise in structuring a negotiated acquisition, such as the use of
confidentiality agreements and letters of intent and dealing with the
rights of the target's and the acquirer's shareholders to vote and to dis-
sent and have their shares appraised. None of these topics is addressed
extensively in the articles in this Symposium, but many of these topics
were discussed at the Institute. For example, Vince Garrity discussed
confidentiality agreements and letters of intent.
Section VI addresses certain issues under the federal securities laws
impacting mergers and acquisitions, including the law governing the dis-
closure of merger negotiations, the drafting of proxy statements under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 34 Act), and the registration
requirements under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 33 Act). This Sym-
posium does not contain articles addressing these issues directly, but
SEC Commissioner Ike Hunt's article entitled Plain English-Changing
the Corporate Culture," which is based on his luncheon address at the
Institute, addresses the SEC's efforts to ensure that merger and other
disclosure documents comply with the SEC's plain English initiative.
Also, various issues involving disclosure under the SEC rules were
addressed at the Institute by Catherine Dixon, Chief of Mergers and
Acquisitions of the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance, Linda Quinn,
co-head of the Corporate Finance Practice group at Shearman & Ster-
ling, and Neil Anderson a partner at Sullivan & Cromwell.
Section VII addresses some of the tax and accounting aspects
involved in structuring a merger or acquisition. Although this Sympo-
sium does not contain separate articles dealing with tax and accounting
issues, at the Institute Michael Schler, a tax partner at Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, addressed tax issues and Ron Weissman, a partner with
Arthur Andersen LLP addressed accounting issues. Also, Section VII
briefly introduces the tax and non-tax aspects of spinoffs, which may be
11. Issac C. Hunt, Jr., Plain English-Changing the Corporate Culture, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV.
713 (1997) [hereinafter Hunt, Plain English].
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utilized in conjunction with an acquisition. At the Institute, the tax
aspects of these transactions were addressed by Mr. Schler, and the non-
tax aspects were addressed by John Bick of Davis Polk & Wardwell.
Before proceeding with an acquisition, the acquirer will in most
cases conduct a thorough due diligence investigation of the target for the
purpose of identifying potential risks associated with the target. Section
VIII addresses this topic generally and also introduces an article by
Howard Shecter, a partner at Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, entitled
Selected Risk Issues in Merger and Acquisition Transactions.'2 In this
article, Mr. Shecter addresses successor liability in asset acquisitions,
employee benefit issues, environmental issues, labor and employment
law issues, and intellectual property issues.
Section IX addresses issues that can arise in the drafting of the
acquisition agreement and introduces two articles in this Symposium
dealing with this topic. First, Lou Kling, a partner at Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meager & Flom LLP, and two co-authors address a range of
issues that can arise in drafting an acquisition agreement in their article
entitled Summary of Acquisition Agreements. 3 Second, Gil Sparks, a
partner in Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell, addresses lock-ups and
fiduciary-out provisions of merger agreements in his article entitled
Merger Agreements Under Delaware Law-When Can Directors
Change Their Minds? 4 The law governing lock-ups and fiduciary-outs
is in a state of flux and Gil Sparks provides a guide for approaching
some of the issues.
Section X briefly discusses the impact of the open market purchase
and tender offer rules under the Williams Act provisions of the 34 Act.
These provisions are also addressed on a comparative basis in Section
XI, which focuses on international acquisitions and introduces an article
entitled, Toward A Cohesive International Approach to Cross Border
Takeover Regulation,15 which was written by Ed Greene, a partner at
Cleary, Gottleib, Steen & Hamilton in London, and two of his
colleagues.
12. Howard L. Shecter, Selected Risk Issues in Merger and Acquisition Transactions, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 719 (1997) [hereinafter Shecter, Selected Risks Issues].
13. Lou R. Kling et al., Summary of Acquisition Agreements, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 779 (1997)
[hereinafter Kling, Acquisitions Agreements].
14. Gilchrist Sparks, 1II, Merger Agreements Under Delaware Law-When Can Directors
Change Their Minds?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815 (1997) [hereinafter Sparks, Fiduciary Outs].
15. Edward F. Greene et al., Toward A Cohesive International Approach to Cross Border
Takeover Regulation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 823 (1997) [hereinafter Greene, Cross-border
Takeover Regulation]. Paul Shim of Cleary in New York substituted for Mr. Greene at the
Institute.
[Vol. 51:533
1997] SYMPOSIUM GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 539
II. LAW GOVERNING A TARGET'S DIRECTORS IN NEGOTIATED AND
HOSTILE TRANSACTIONS
In the first article in this Symposium, which is entitled The Direc-
tor's Duty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions,16 Professor Eisenberg
points out that in many areas of the law the standards governing conduct
and the standards governing review are conflated. As an example, he
says that the "standard of conduct that governs automobile drivers is that
they should drive carefully, and the standard of review in a liability
claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully."17
This conflation does not exist, however, in the context of the per-
formance by corporate officers and directors of their responsibilities in
situations in which they are not interested. If they are not interested, the
duty of loyalty is not implicated. In such cases, the standard of conduct
governing the directors and officers is the duty of care. This doctrine
requires the director or officer to act in good faith, in a manner he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the corporation, and with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would be expected to exercise
in a like position and under similar circumstances. The standard of
review of such action, however, is governed by the business judgment
rule. This rule broadly provides that if the director has made a "good
faith" decision in what the director perceives to be in the best interest of
the corporation after being properly informed, the director will not be
held liable provided he or she does not have a financial interest in the
matter. If, on the other hand, the business judgment rule is not satisfied,
the standard of review is comparable to the standard of conduct in mak-
ing the decision. Consequently, the standard of review is based on fair-
ness. That is, if the business judgment rule is not applicable, the
directors have the burden of proving that the transaction is "entirely
fair."
In applying the business judgment rule, the question is whether the
decision was rational, not whether it was reasonable. This rationality
standard is much less stringent than the reasonableness standard. As
Professor Eisenberg points out, "[i]t is common to characterize a per-
son's conduct as imprudent or unreasonable, but it is very uncommon to
characterize a person's conduct as irrational." 8 Professor Eisenberg
argues that there are considerations of both fairness and policy which
support the present formulation of the business judgment rule. He points
out that in certain transactions that are not traditionally self-interested,
the corporate law has developed a heightened standard of review. For
16. Eisenberg, Duty of Care, supra note 4.
17. Id. at 580.
18. Id. at 585.
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example, in examining the actions of a target's directors in defending
against a hostile takeover, the Delaware courts have developed an
enhanced scrutiny rule as set forth in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Company.19 Under Unocal, a target's directors taking defensive actions
have the burden of proving that first they had "reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed,"
and second that the defensive measures adopted were "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed." The first part of the test is satisfied by a
showing of good faith and reasonable investigation, which can be more
easily established if the board has a majority of independent directors.2"
Section 6.02(a) of the ALI's PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE also adopts an enhanced standard of review. Under this provision,
a target's board "may take an action that has the foreseeable effect of
blocking an unsolicited tender offer, if the action is a reasonable
response to the offer."'" Under the ALI formulation, the burden is on
the plaintiff to establish that the board's action was not reasonable.
At this point, Professor Eisenberg reaches the central thesis of his
article. He argues that "[i]n the case of a simple negotiated disposition,
there are several reasons why the decision-making process should be
reviewed under a standard of enhanced scrutiny, even though, unlike
blocking actions, dispositions are not engaged in for entrenchment pur-
poses. 2 2 He points out that this is a standard of review and does not
interfere with the current standard of conduct that governs directors in a
disposition transaction. He further argues that the following four Dela-
ware cases broadly support this "disposition principle:" Smith v. Van
Gorkom;23 Cede v. Technicolor, Inc. ;24 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holding, Inc. ;25 and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network,
Inc. 26
In connection with the Van Gorkom decision, he argues that it can
be "explained by the disposition principle, that is, that in the case of a
negotiated disposition the decision-making process would be reviewed
with special scrutiny to insure that the process provided reasonable
assurance that the disposition was made at the best price reasonably
available. 27
19. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
20. Eisenberg, Duty of Care, supra note 4, at 591-92.
21. Section 6.02 is discussed in Thompson, ALl Principles, supra note 3, at 224-43.
22. Eisenberg, Duty of Care, supra note 4, at 28.
23. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
24. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
25. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
26. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
27. Id. at 49.
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The fundamental reason for advancing the disposition principle is
that even though negotiated acquisitions are at arm's length, they typi-
cally involve significant conflicts of interest, which Professor Eisenberg
argues were present in Van Gorkom, Technicolor, Revlon and QVC. He
concludes that "in all four cases ... boards acted in a way that defies
explanation except on the ground of being ill-informed, subservient, or
both.""8
Finally, Professor Eisenberg argues that even though the Delaware
cases do not explicitly adopt the enhanced scrutiny embodied in his dis-
position principle, the cases can be "rationalized on the basis of that rule
better than on the basis given in the opinions," 29 and he goes on to argue
that prudent lawyers should encourage directors in negotiated acquisi-
tions to "make their decisions as if the strict scrutiny rule or something
very like it will be applied to their conduct. '30
In his article entitled The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions
Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests?,3 1 Professor Cof-
fee addresses three questions. First, to what extent can shareholders
give the board mandatory instructions through a bylaw amendment?
Second, if the shareholders provide such a bylaw, can the board respond
by repealing it? Third, if the board can repeal a shareholder-passed by-
law, can the shareholders limit this power by use of procedural provi-
sions in the by-law?
These issues bear on the ability of shareholders to limit the defen-
sive tactics a target's board can undertake. Professor Coffee begins by
pointing out that under Delaware law the answer to these questions is
not at all certain, because of the inherent conflict in section 109 of the
Delaware General Business Corporation Law, which seems to give the
shareholders such power, and section 141(a), which gives the board of
directors the authority to manage the corporation.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) gets involved
with these issues through its Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which regulates shareholder proposals and proxy state-
ments. Professor Coffee points out that Rule 14a-8(c)(1) permits a cor-
poration to exclude any shareholder proposal that "under the laws of the
registrant's domicile, is not a proper subject for action for security hold-
ers," and he goes on to review the recent actions by the SEC in dealing
with precatory shareholder proposals. In the 1993 Pennzoil No-Action
28. Eisenberg, Duty of Care, supra note 4, at 49.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id.
31. Coffee, Bylaw Battlefield, supra note 5.
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letter,32 the SEC backed-off an earlier position that took a liberal view in
permitting such proposals. As a consequence of this action, Professor
Coffee points out that institutional investors have not recently made
extensive use of the bylaw amendment approach under Rule 14a-8. He
further discusses the efforts by Guy Weisser-Pratte to have the share-
holders of Wallace Computer Services adopt a mandatory bylaw amend-
ment requiring the redemption of an existing poison pill. Although this
effort was not successful, Mr. Weisser-Pratte is engaged in a similar
effort with regard to Rexene Corporation.
Notwithstanding the ambiguity in Delaware law, Professor Coffee
discusses a recent decision under Oklahoma law which held that share-
holders have a right to advance a non-binding resolution calling for a
shareholder vote prior to the adoption of a poison pill. 33 Professor Cof-
fee points out the Delaware law is essentially the same as Oklahoma law
with respect to the issue addressed in this case. He goes on to conclude
that "[s]hareholder ratification of a future poison pill seems well within
Section 109's scope, particularly to the extent that Delaware decisions
also recognize that there is an element of self-dealing in defensive
tactics."34
Turning to the question of whether the board may repeal a share-
holder adopted bylaw amendment, Professor Coffee contends that
although the answer to this question is uncertain, the shareholders
should be able to specify the manner in which any shareholder adopted
bylaw can be amended by the board. Also, Professor Coffee points out
that section 10.20 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act espe-
cially recognizes that the shareholders have the authority to prohibit
board amendment of a shareholder passed bylaw. He further points out
that twenty-two states have provisions to a similar effect in their corpo-
rate codes.
Professor Coffee concludes by saying that the law in this area is
still in the process of development and that. we are at a "critical junction
for future by-law amendments."
In the next article, Dennis J. Block, Jonathan M. Hoff, and H.
Esther Cochran address the target's directors' duties in a hostile transac-
tion in their article Defensive Measures in Anticipation of and in
Response to Unsolicited Takeover Proposals.35 One of the first points
the authors make is that a target's directors should prepare in advance to
32. In re Pennzoil Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (March 22, 1993), available in 1993
SEC No-Act LEXIS 503 at *1.
33. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters General Fund v. Fleming Companies, Inc.,
No. Civ. 96-165C-A (W.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 1997).
34. Coffee, Bylaw Battlefield, supra note 5.
35. Block, Defensive Measures, supra note 8.
[Vol. 51:533
1997] SYMPOSIUM GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 543
respond to an unsolicited takeover. They further point out that as illus-
trated in the Unocal decision the takeover measures may be imple-
mented for the purpose of entrenching the target's board as well as for
the purpose of advancing shareholder interest. Consequently, the
enhanced scrutiny test of Unocal was adopted.
Much of this article is an elaboration upon the Unocal theme, and
the authors discuss many cases that illustrate the contours of Unocal.
For example, the authors discuss Unitrin, Inc., v. American General
Corp., 36 where the court articulated a two-step approach under Unocal.
In Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court said that the defensive measure
cannot be "coercive" or "preclusive" and must fall within a "range of
reasonableness." Thus, the coercion, preclusive, and range of reasona-
bleness tests are applied in determining whether the defensive measure
is reasonable in response to the threat posed. The court specifically
found that the target's repurchase program was not coercive or preclu-
sive and was within the range of reasonableness.
In addition to the Unocal test, the authors also discuss the Revlon
principle, which applies in a sale of control situation in which the direc-
tors' role changes from "defenders of the corporate bastion to auction-
eers charged with getting the best price for the shareholders." The
authors explore the limits of the Revlon principle and among other
things show how it was applied in Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc.37
Another seminal case dealing with defensive tactics that the authors
discuss is Moore Corp. Limited v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc.38 In
Moore, the target's directors merely stood by their poison pill in the face
of a hostile tender offer. The directors had analyzed the offer and con-
cluded, after seeking advice from various experts, that the long-term
strategy the target was following was more valuable to the shareholders
than the price being offered by the acquirer. Applying Unocal, the court
found that the target's board was reasonable in concluding that the
acquirer's offer was inadequate and thereby posed a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness. Thus, the board satisfied the first prong of the
Unocal test. The court went on to say the refusal by the target's board to
redeem the poison pill was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed
because the refusal was neither preclusive nor coercive."
An appreciation of the principles in these four decisions will go a
long way to understanding the many defensive tactics explored by the
authors. Some of the more important defensive measures addressed are
36. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
37. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
38. 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the adoption of a staggered board to prevent an acquirer from immedi-
ately replacing the target's board pursuant to a proxy contest and the
adoption of shareholder rights plans, which is probably the most effec-
tive deterrent against hostile offers. In this regard, the authors discuss
the possible implications of the use of a continuing director, or a "Dead
Head" provision, which provides that only those directors who were
seated at the time the poison pill was adopted can redeem the pill. These
provisions are also discussed by Mr. Neff and are explored further
below.
Another defensive tactic is the issuance of stock into friendly
hands. Such transactions may be particularly beneficial in helping to
make the target takeover-proof under a state takeover statute such as
Delaware's business combination statute which does not apply if an
acquirer acquires 85% of the target shares in one transaction. Thus, if
more than 15% of the stock of a target can be placed in the hands of a
person friendly to the target, this exception to the Delaware business
combination statute would not be available. Another important defen-
sive tactic addressed in a comprehensive way by the authors is the use of
employee stock ownership plans. These plans can be particularly help-
ful in defending the target, but also, as the authors indicate, the plans
must be used carefully and significant issues under ERISA must be
addressed. The authors also address the strategies for offering economic
alternatives such as recapitalizations. These strategies may be enjoined
if, for example, the economic alternative is in essence preclusive or
coercive and does not fall within the range of reasonableness, as set
forth in Unitrin.
The authors explore in a detailed way the implications of using
lock-ups and leg-ups, which give a potential acquiring corporation the
right to acquire a stock interest in the target corporation as a way of
discouraging hostile offers from an unwanted acquirer. The authors
point out that these devices must not foreclose the possibility of the tar-
get's board considering other possible offers. The topic is also touched
on by Gil Sparks in his article dealing with fiduciary outs. 39
The authors also address other topics such as change of control
employment contracts, defensive acquisitions, state regulation of take-
overs, including the application of the Pennsylvania Business Corpora-
tion Law in Norfolk Southern Corporation v. Conrail, Inc.4" The
authors point out that Pennsylvania law explicitly rejects the Unocal and
Revlon principles. Under Pennsylvania law, a corporation's directors
are given much more latitude in constructing defensive measures and
39. Sparks, Fiduciary Outs, supra note 14.
40. C.A. No. 96-CV-7167 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
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will be scrutinized under the standard business judgment rule as opposed
to enhanced scrutiny required by Unocal.
Neither Professor Eisenberg nor Dennis Block and his co-authors
address precisely the action a target's board is required to take when it
negotiates a friendly acquisition of the target by an acquirer in exchange
for the acquirer's stock and a hostile acquirer then shows up and makes
a bid for the target. The authors do not specifically indicate whether the
target's directors can negotiate the transaction with the acquirer without
first doing some kind of market test to determine the best price reason-
ably available to the target, and they do not indicate what the target's
actions should be in the event a third-party acquirer shows up. This is
an important question because most acquisitions involve friendly negoti-
ations between an acquirer and a target, and many friendly transactions
may end up in a hostile mode.
In the next article dealing with the role of a target's directors, The
Impact of State Statutes and Continuing Director Rights Plans,4 Dan
Neff addresses two broad topics: the impact of state statutes on fiduciary
duties of directors in takeovers, and the impact of continuing directors
provisions of shareholder's rights plans.
Mr. Neff begins by observing that although there have not been any
significant changes in the basic doctrines under Delaware law dealing
with defensive tactics in mergers, there have been several recent devel-
opments in states other than Delaware that have provided greater protec-
tion to a target's directors in a takeover context than the enhanced
scrutiny that applies in Delaware under such cases as Unocal and the
auction requirement of Revlon. Mr. Neff outlines the principle types of
state statutes regulating takeovers. These include control share acquisi-
tion statutes, which deny a hostile acquirer that acquires in excess 20%
of the stock of target the right to vote, unless the acquirer obtains share-
holder agreement granting such rights. Also included are moratorium or
business combination statutes, which prohibit a hostile acquirer that
acquires more than a certain percentage of the target's stock from com-
pleting a second-step merger for a fixed period of time after the
acquisition.
Such statutes may permit the second-step transaction to occur if
certain conditions are satisfied, such as the approval of the disinterested
directors and shareholders, as provided in section 203 of the Delaware
General Business Corporation Law. In the alternative, such statutes may
absolutely prohibit a second-step merger for a specified period as is the
case with the Wisconsin statute that was held to be constitutional and
41. Neff, State Statutes, supra note 9.
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not preempted by the Williams Act in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Uni-
versal Foods Corp.4" Other statutes specifically reject the enhanced
scrutiny test in Delaware which was adopted by Unocal. Mr. Neff also
points out that several states have adopted constituency statutes which
authorize the board to consider the effects of the proposed takeover on
the company's employees, consumers, and other constituencies.
Contrasting the approach in Delaware with the approach taken in
certain other states, Mr. Neff discusses the Fourth Circuit's decision in
WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,4 which interprets the Virginia
Business Corporation Statute in the context of defensive measures taken
by a target corporation. The Virginia statute specifically does not permit
any inquiry into the reasonableness of the directors' actions but focuses
solely on whether the directors acted in good faith. Under this statute,
the court held that the acquirer was only entitled to discovery with
regard to certain procedural issues that bear on the factors of good faith.
Mr. Neff also discusses the Pennsylvania federal district court's
decision in the Conrail case, where the court said that Unocal and Rev-
lon are "myopic" and specifically do not apply under the Pennsylvania
statute. This Conrail case is addressed in detail in an article by Vince
Garrity and Mark Morton, which is introduced below.
Mr. Neff then turns to continuing director provisions which provide
that a share purchase plan (i.e., poison pill) can only be redeemed by a
majority of continuing directors, that is those directors who held office
before the battle commenced. Mr. Neff goes on to discuss Bank of New
York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp.," which he says is the only case that has
directly addressed the validity of a continuing director provision. This
case held that such a provision was not permissible under New York
law. Although the Delaware courts have not directly addressed the
issue, he does, however, discuss several Delaware cases that bear on this
issue. Finally, Mr. Neff points out that for states other than Delaware
that have specific statutory provisions authorizing poison pills even if
the statutes do not deal directly with the continuing director issue, the
statute may be interpreted to have implicitly sanctioned such provisions.
In the final article dealing with the law governing the target's direc-
tors, Vince Garrity and Mark Morton consider whether the Delaware
courts would have reached the same conclusion that was reached under
Pennsylvania law in the CSX/Conrail transaction, which involved the
use of various lock-up devices. In this transaction, CSX Corporation,
the acquirer and largest U.S. railroad, and Conrail, Inc., the target and
42. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
43. 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995).
44. 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
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fifth largest railroad, entered into a merger agreement pursuant to which
CSX would have acquired Conrail in a multi-step transaction for, in
essence, $92.50 per share. Norfolk Southern Corporation (Norfolk) also
a railroad company, made a competing bid for Conrail at $100 per share,
which was later raised to $115 per share. Norfolk challenged the CSX/
Conrail merger, and since Conrail is a Pennsylvania corporation, Penn-
sylvania law applied. The article, which is entitled Would the CSX/Con-
rail Express Have Derailed in Delaware? A Comparative Analysis of
Lock-Up Provisions Under Delaware and Pennsylvania Law,45 starts
out by discussing the various lock-up provisions employed in the merger
agreement between CSX and Conrail.46
First, the agreement contained a break-up or termination fee of
$300 million, which represented 3% of the transaction price at the time
the deal was first struck.47 Second, the merger agreement contained a
stock option, which granted CSX the right to acquire 10% of Conrail's
shares for $92.50, the price to be paid by CSX in the acquisition.48
There was no cap on the benefit that CSX could realized upon exercise
of the option. Third, the agreement contained a no-shop clause which,
subject to certain exceptions, prohibited Conrail's directors from (i)
soliciting or participating in negotiations concerning another takeover
proposal, (ii) approving or recommending another takeover proposal, or
(iii) withdrawing or modifying their recommendation of the CSX acqui-
sition for a period of 180 days. 49 This black-out period was later
extended to 720 days (i.e., from December 19, 1996 to December 31,
1998). 50 Fourth, Conrail agreed that, except with regard to the CSX
acquisition, it would not amend its poison pill without the consent of
CSX or take any action with respect to its poison pill to facilitate any
other offer.5'
The authors discuss the three preliminary injunction hearings in this
case in which the district court, ruling from the bench, rejected Nor-
folk's challenge to these lock-ups. In the first opinion, the court pointed
out that section 1715 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law
(PBCL) permits directors in rendering decisions to consider constituen-
cies other than shareholders and to consider both short and long-term
interest of the corporation. 52 The court also pointed out that section
45. Garrity, The CSX/Conrail Express, supra note 10.




50. See id. at Part I.G.
51. See id.
52. See id. at Part I.C.
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1715(c) of the PBCL provides that the fiduciary duties of directors do
not require them to redeem or modify any poison pill,53 and that Section
1715(d) provides that if a board's action is approved by a majority of
disinterested directors, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that
the board did not render its decision in good faith after reasonable inves-
tigation.54 In finding that Norfolk failed to meet this burden, the court
said that these provisions of the PBCL specifically reject such Delaware
cases as Unocal and Revlon.55
In the third preliminary injunction hearing, the district court specifi-
cally approved the 720 day no-shop clause, reasoning that there is "no
principled reason" why the lock-out cannot extend for the full period of
the merger contract.56
In turning to Delaware law, the authors first point out that lock-ups
are not considered per se illegal,57 and that in negotiated transactions the
standard of review in examining the use by a target's board of lock-ups
is the standard business judgment rule. 8 In hostile transactions, how-
ever, the Unocal enhanced business judgment standard applies, 59 unless
the Revlon duty to auction rule applies because there is a change of
control of the target.60 The authors then discuss a series of Delaware
cases that have dealt with lock-ups in a variety of contexts. 6 1
Finally, the authors apply the law of Delaware to the facts in the
CSX/Conrail transaction. 62 The authors conclude that while the stan-
dard business judgment rule may have applied to the lock-up provisions
of the initial merger agreement, the Unocal enhanced business judgment
rule would apply to the 720 day extension of the no-shop clause, and
that the extension would be found to be preclusive under Unitrin.63 The
authors further conclude that since 40% of the consideration to be paid
by CSX is cash and only 60% is stock of CSX, a change of control of
Conrail has occurred and Revlon, therefore applies. The authors argue
that the exception to Revlon for transactions in which the target's share-
holders receive stock of the acquirer and after the merger the stock of
the acquirer is held by a "fluid aggregation" of shareholders, should not




56. See id. at Part II.H.
57. See id. at Part Ii.
58. See id. at Part III.A.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at Parts III.B.-D.
62. See id. at Part IV.
63. See id. at Part IV.A.
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tion.64 The authors, therefore, conclude that, under both Unocal and
Revlon, each of the lock-ups-the termination fee, the stock option, the
no-shop clause, and the limitations on the poison pill-would be invalid
and unenforceable.
III. VALUATION OF THE TARGET
As explained at the Institute by Bob Lovejoy, the primary methods
of valuing a target are (1) the comparable companies trading analysis,
(2) the comparable transactions analysis, and (3) the discounted cash
flow (DCF) analysis.65 Both comparable companies and the comparable
transactions approaches are based on the principle that the value of an
asset (i.e., a target) may be determined by referring to the value of com-
parable assets (i.e., a comparable company) recently sold by a reason-
ably informed seller to a reasonably informed purchaser.66 Professor
Cornell refers to these two methods as direct comparison approaches to
valuation.67
The DCF approach to valuation involves a four step process. First,
the analyst estimates the amount and timing of the free cash flows
expected to be generated by the target over a forecast period during
which the target is expected to grow.68 Second, the analyst estimates the
expected value of the target at the end of the forecast period, this is
referred to as the terminal value. 69 Third, the analyst determines the
appropriate discount rate to be utilized in discounting the target's free
cash flows and terminal value. If the target is engaged in different lines
of business, separate discount rates may have to be determined for each
business, taking into account the risk associated with the particular busi-
ness. Probably the most used tool for determining the discount rate is
the Capital Asset Pricing Model.7 ° If the target is engaged in one line of
business it may be appropriate to use the weighted average cost of capi-
tol in determining the discount rate.7'
Fourth, the target's free cash flows and terminal values are dis-
counted to present value at the applicable discount rate using the DCF
64. See id. at Part IV.C.
65. Each of these methods is explored in detail in Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer's
Guide to Modem Valuation Techniques in Mergers and Acquisitions, 21 J. CORP. L. 456 (1996)
[hereinafter Thompson, Modern Valuation] and in THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A,
supra note I, at ch. 7.
66. See Thompson, Modern Valuation, supra note 65.
67. See BRADFORD CORNELL, CORPORATE VALUATION: TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL
AND DECISION MAKING (1993).
68. See Thompson, Modern Valuation, supra note 65, at 481-89.
69. See id. at 481-500.
70. See id. at 501-21.
71. See id. at 521-25.
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model. This gives an estimate of today's value of the target's expected
cash flows.
An investment in a target should only be undertaken if the transac-
tion produces a positive net present value, which means that the cost of
acquiring the target is less than the present value of the target's free cash
flows and terminal value.72
Each of these methods (comparable companies, comparable trans-
action and DCF) will generally be used by investment bankers in valu-
ing a target. For example, in Time, Inc.'s acquisition of Warner
Communications, Inc., the investment bankers for both time and Warner
used all three techniques in valuing Warner.73
A recent study of several leverage buyouts found "evidence that
discounted cash flow valuation methods provide reliable estimates of
market value."74
IV. ANTITRUST AND PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATION
A. Substantive Antitrust
As indicted by the FTC's recent decision to oppose the merger of
two office supply discounters, Staples, Inc. and Office Depot, Inc., even
though the companies planned substantial divestitures,75 the antitrust
authorities may be taking a more aggressive approach to merger enforce-
ment. At the federal level, the antitrust aspects of a merger generally
will be examined by either the FTC or the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice (DOJ). Also, other federal regulatory agencies,
such as the Federal Reserve Board, may have a role in antitrust enforce-
ment for a particular industry. In addition, the State Attorneys General
may enforce the federal or state antitrust statutes.
The principal federal antitrust statute governing mergers and acqui-
sitions is section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits certain acquisi-
tions "where in any line of commerce [i.e., in the relevant product
market] . . . in any section of the country [i.e., in the relevant geographic
market], the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
In 1992, the DOJ and FTC jointly published Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, and as indicated below, the section of these guidelines deal-
ing with efficiencies was revised in April 1997. These 1992 DOJ/FTC
72. See id. at 471-73.
73. See id. at apps. A through D.
74. Steven N. Kaplan & Richard S. Ruback, The Valuation of Cash Flow Forecasts, 50 J. OF
FIN. 1059, 1091 (1995).
75. See John M. Broder, FTC Rejects Deal to Join Two Giants of Office Supplies, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1997, at Al.
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Guidelines replaced the provisions of the DOJ's 1984 Merger Guide-
lines dealing with horizontal mergers. The provisions of the 1984
Guidelines dealing with conglomerate and vertical mergers continue to
be in effect. Also, in 1993, the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral promulgated Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which set forth the gen-
eral enforcement policy of the state attorneys general.
This section briefly outlines the approach taken in the 1992 DOJ/
FTC Guidelines, which sets out a five step analytical process the DOJ
and FTC follow -in determining whether a merger will likely enhance
market power or facilitate its exercise and therefore, should be
prohibited.76
First step. The first step is to determine whether the merger would
significantly increase concentration and result in a concentrated market,
properly defined. Thus, the starting point is the definition of the market
and the determination of concentration levels in the market.
The relevant market is determined by applying a formula that is
premised on the microeconomic concept of cross elasticity of demand.
Thus, market definition under the 1992 DOJ/FTC Guidelines focuses on
the demand side of the market.
After determining the relevant market, the final part of the first step
is to determine the level of concentration in the market. This involves
an analysis of the productive capacities of both actual competitors and
certain potential competitors (i.e., "uncommitted entrants"). Uncommit-
ted entrants are firms that could begin producing in the relevant market
quickly without incurring significant "sunk" costs of entry or exit. Thus,
these are the "hit and run" potential entrants of the contestable market
theory.
Second step. The second step in the 1992 DOJ/FTC Guidelines is
to determine whether, in view of market concentration and numerous
other factors, the merger raises concerns about potential anticompetitive
effects, Thus, in ascertaining whether there is any anticompetitive
effect, consideration is given both to the concentration level in the mar-
ket and to an examination of market structure to determine whether the
market is likely to be characterized by either coordinated interactions or
unilateral anticompetitive effects.
The guidelines divide markets into three concentration levels
76. See generally PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, chs. 9, 10, and 11
(1978); CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE, MERGER ANALYSIS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1996);
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE (1994); THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch, 8; and
SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR. A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTITRUST
MERGER GUIDELINES (forthcoming 1997).
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depending on the post-merger Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The
HHI is determined by squaring the market shares of the firms in the
market. Thus, if one firm has 100% of a market, the HHI is 10,000,
indicating a monopoly, and if each of 100 firms in a market has 1% of
the market, the HHI is 100, indicating a competitive market.
The tentative enforcement decision depends on both the total post-
merger HHI for the market and the increase in the HHI resulting from
the merger. Markets with a post-merger, HHI of 1000, which corre-
sponds roughly to a 4-firm concentration level of 40%, are considered
unconcentrated, and mergers in this range are rarely challenged. Mar-
kets with a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 1800, which corre-
sponds roughly to a four firm concentration level of 70%, are considered
moderately concentrated. Mergers, in this range, producing substantial
increases in concentration may be challenged depending on an analysis
of (1) coordinated and unilateral effects, (2) entry conditions (see Third
Step), (3) efficiencies (see Fourth Step) and (4) the failing firm doctrine
(see Fifth Step).
Markets with an HHI above 1800 are considered highly concen-
trated, and mergers in this range producing moderate increases in con-
centration may be challenged depending upon an analysis of the above
mentioned four factors.
In summary, the second step involves a determination of whether
the post-merger concentration levels in the market and the increase in
concentration resulting from the merger provide a basis for competitive
concern. If so, then the second step proceeds to an analysis of whether
the merger is likely to lead to coordinated interactions or unilateral
anticompetitive effects. If after an analysis of these three oligopoly fac-
tors (concentration, coordinated interactions, and unilateral effects) it is
tentatively decided to challenge the merger, the analysis proceeds to the
third step.
Third step. The third step is to determine whether entry into the
market by "committed entrants" would be timely, likely and sufficient to
deconcentrate the market. Committed entrants are those potential
entrants that could enter only by incurring significant sunk costs.
Even if the merger appears to be anticompetitive after an analysis
of concentration levels and the other oligopoly factors, it may not be
challenged if the possibility of new entry by committed entrants would
prevent the exercise of market power.
Fourth step. If after considering entry the decision to challenge
still holds, then the analysis proceeds to the fourth step: determining
whether there are any efficiency gains that cannot be attained otherwise.
Thus, the presence of efficiencies may lead to the decision not to chal-
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lenge a merger. On April 8, 1997, the DOJ and the FTC issued a revi-
sion of section 4 of the 1992 DOJ/FTC Guidelines, which addresses
efficiencies. Under this revision, "merger specific" efficiencies that
have been verified and that do not arise from anticompetitive reductions
in output or service are treated as "cognizable efficiencies." Under the
enforcement standard, the agencies "will not challenge a merger if cog-
nizable efficiencies are of a character and magnitude such that the
merger is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant market."
Fifth step. If after going through the first four steps, a decision to
challenge the merger is made, then the analysis turns to the fifth step:
determining whether the failing firm exception applies.
B. Pre-Merger Notification
As pointed out at the Institute by Mr. Whitener, the parties to a
merger or acquisition will generally have to file notification with the
FTC and DOJ under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification law
(HSR) if the deal has a value of $15 million or more and one of the
companies has sales or assets of $100 million and the other has sales or
assets of $10 million." This summary captures several concepts embod-
ied in HSR and in the rules.78
To be subject to HSR three tests must be satisfied: (1) The Com-
merce test,79 which will be satisfied in virtually every acquisition, (2)
the Size of Person test,8° and (3) the Size of Transaction test.8'
The first step in determining whether HSR applies is to identify the
"Acquiring Person" and "Acquired Person. 82 Under the rules, the
Acquiring Person is basically defined as the "ultimate parent entity"
(UPE), that is, a non-controlled parent, and all of its controlled subsidi-
aries that hold stock or assets of the Acquired Person as a result of the
acquisition.83 The Acquired Person is basically defined as the UPE and
controlled subsidiaries of the target company.84
The Size of Person test is generally satisfied if either the Acquiring
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). See generally, STEPHEN M. AXINN ET AL., ACQUISITIONS
UNDER THE HART-SCOTr-RODINO ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENT ACT (revised Edition, 1984);
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS
(1995); and Thompson, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 9.
78. The rules are contained in Rules, Regulations, Statements and Interpretations Under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 16 C.F.R. § 801 (1996).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(1) (1994).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2) (1994).
81. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3) (1994).
82. See 16 C.F.R. § 801.2 (1996); THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note I
at § 9.4.B.2.
83. See 16 C.F.R. § 801.2(a).
84. See 16 C.F.R. § 801.2(b).
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Person or Acquired Person has at least $100 million in sales or assets,
and the other has at least $10 million in sales or assets. s5
Under section 18a(a)(3), the Size of Transaction test is satisfied if
the Acquiring Person acquires either 15% or $15 million of the Acquired
Person's asset or voting securities (stock). This statutory test is modi-
fied by the minimum dollar exemption of section 802.20. Under this
exemption, the Size of Transaction test is satisfied in an asset acquisition
if more than $15 million of the Acquired Person's assets are acquired.
In a stock acquisition, if more than 15% but less than 50% of the
Acquired Person's stock is acquired, the Size of Transaction test is satis-
fied if more than $15 million of stock is acquired. If 50% or more of the
Acquired Person's stock is acquired the Size of Transaction test is satis-
fied if either (1) more than $15 million of stock is acquired, or (2) less
than $15 million of stock is acquired and the Acquired Person has assets
or sales of at least $25 million. In each of these cases, the Acquired
Person must have sales or assets of at least $10 million or the Size of
Person test will not be satisfied.
In summary, the Size of Transaction test as modified by the mini-
mum dollar exemption is met if:
(1) The Acquired Person would hold more than $15 million
of the Acquire Person's assets or stock;
(2) The Acquired Person would hold at least 15% but not
more than 50% of the Acquired Person's stock and such
stock has value of more than $15 million dollars;
(3) The Acquired Person would hold 50% or more of the
Acquired Person's stock and such stock has a value of more
than $15 million dollars; and
(4) The Acquiring Person would hold 50% or more of the
Acquired Person's stock, such stock does not have a value
of more than $15 million, but the target has annual net sales
or assets of $25 million or more.8 6
In a negotiated merger there is a thirty day waiting period before
the parties can complete the transaction, and the waiting period does not
start until both the Acquiring Person and the Acquired Person file. 7 In
a cash tender offer the waiting period is fifteen days after the Acquiring
Person files,88 and the Acquired Person must file ten days after the
Acquiring Person files.89 These waiting periods may be shortened by
85. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(2) (1994). See generally, THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M
& A, supra note 1, at § 9.4.B.4.
86. THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at 9.4.B.5.
87. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 803.10(a), 803.10(b).
88. See 16 C.F.R. § 803.10(a)(1).
89. See 16 C.F.R. § 803.30(b)(2).
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receipt of an early termination notice or lengthened if the applicable
agency files a second request for information. 90
In conducting the review of the transaction, the applicable agency
will give close scrutiny to internal documents concerning the transaction
filed pursuant to section 4(c) of the Pre-Merger Report Form, which
requires that the parties file "all studies, surveys, analyses and reports
which were prepared by or for any officer(s) or director(s) ... for the
purpose of evaluating or analyzing the acquisition with respect to market
shares, competition, competitors, markets."
Under section 18a(g)(1), the penalty for non-compliance with HSR
is $10,000 for each day the required filing is not made.
V. STATE CORPORATE LAW ASPECTS IN STRUCTURING THE
NEGOTIATED MERGER OR ACQUISITION
A. Introduction
This section addresses a variety of state corporate law issues that
can arise in structuring a negotiated merger or acquisition. Subsequent
sections address other state issues in greater detail, including the law
governing successor liability in asset acquisitions.
B. Confidentiality Agreements and Letters of Intent
As pointed out at the Institute by Mr. Garrity, before reaching
agreement on a merger or acquisition, the parties may exchange confi-
dential information and such an exchange should be governed by a con-
fidentiality agreement.
The seller should draft its own confidentiality agreement, and the
agreement should be binding and in appropriate cases reciprocal. Each
party should keep a log of all information turned over to the other and
there should be a method for determining that all documents are
returned. 9'
Turning to letters of intent, which Mr. Garrity refers to as the
"devil's work," particular attention should be given in deciding whether
to use them. As illustrated in Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co.,92 a letter of
intent or an agreement in principle may in certain circumstances be
interpreted as a binding contract and a breaching party or third party
90. See generally THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at § 9.4.D.
91. For general discussions of confidentiality agreements see KLING, NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS, supra note 1, at ch. 9; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1,
at ch. 10. For a sample confidentiality agreement with commentary see, MODEL STOCK PURCHASE
AGREEMENT, supra note 2, at 327.
92. 729 S.W. 2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988), appeal
dismissed on agreement of the parties, 748 S.W. 2d 631 (Tex. App. 1988).
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interloper may be liable for significant damages.93
Mr. Garrity gives the following reasons for using a letter of intent:
(1) the lender for the buyer might require a letter of intent for financing;
(2) a letter of intent may be used to start the clock running for Hart-
Scott-Rodino purposes; (3) a letter of intent focuses the seller and buyer
on the essential economic terms of the deal; and (4) some parties feel a
"moral" commitment to a deal after signing a letter of intent.
Mr. Garrity gives the following reasons for not using a letter of
intent: (1) the letter of intent might end up in court as evidence of a deal;
(2) a letter of intent can be legally binding; (3) a letter of intent might
create an implied duty to negotiate in good faith; (4) the seller might be
viewed as damaged goods if the seller signs a letter of intent and the deal
subsequently falls through; and (5) a letter of intent might increase the
obligation of a public company to announce the deal. Mr. Garrity pre-
fers using term sheets which enunciate the economics of a deal, using
bullet points, but which is not legally binding.
C. Director Exculpation Provisions
Both the target's and the acquirer's directors will generally be pro-
tected from possible personal liability for a breach of the duty of care by
an exculpation provision like section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law.94
D. Shareholders' Right to Vote and to Dissent
1. INTRODUCTION
In structuring any type of merger or acquisition it is important to
ascertain whether the shareholders of the acquirer and the target have the
right to vote and the right to dissent and have their share appraised. This
will involve an examination of the particular state corporate laws gov-
erning the acquirer and the target. Also, if the acquirer is publicly-
traded, consideration will have to be given to the exchange rules gov-
erning the acquirer. The discussion here focuses on the following two
types of transactions under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, and the California Corpora-
tion Code:95
93. For a general discussion of letters of intent, see KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra
note 1, at ch. 6; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 10.
94. See EDWARD P. WELCH & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW, FUNDAMENTALS, 15 (1996) [hereinafter FOLK, DELAWARE LAW].
95. For a general discussion of corporate law issues involving shareholders' rights to vote and
dissent, see KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note 1, at ch. I and § 4.08; THOMPSON,
BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 3.
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(1) A direct merger of the target into the acquirer with the target's
shareholders receiving in the alternative stock of the acquirer and cash,
and
(2) a reverse triangular merger in which a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the acquirer merges into target with (a) the target's shareholders
receiving, in the alternative, stock of the acquirer or cash, and (b)
acquirer ending up as the owner of all of the target's outstanding shares.
The approaches taken by these three statutes provide a good illustration
of the different approaches states take to these issues.
2. DIRECT MERGER
The direct merger of a target into acquirer is governed by sections
251 and 262 of Delaware law. Under section 251(c) the target's share-
holders have the right to vote on the transaction, without regard to the
consideration paid. Under sections 251(c) and (f), the acquirer's share-
holders have the right to vote on the transaction, unless the consideration
paid is less than 20% of the acquirer's stock outstanding immediately
before the acquisition.96 Thus, if the consideration is cash, the
acquirer's shareholders do not vote. The same rules generally apply
under both the Revised Model Business Corporation Act97 and the Cali-
fornia Corporations Code.98 The exception from the voting rule in sec-
tion 1201(b) of the California Corporations Code provides that the
acquirer's shareholders do not vote as long as they own immediately
after the merger equity securities possessing more than five-sixths of the
voting power of acquirer. This five-sixths rule is the economic
equivalent of the rules under Delaware law and the Revised Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, which provide that there is no vote unless more
than 20% of the outstanding equity securities of the acquirer are issued
on the merger.
Under section 262, if the shareholders of the target and the share-
holders of the acquirer have the right to vote, then the shareholders also
have the right to dissent and have their shares appraised, subject to the
market out exception of section 262(b). Under this exception, if the
acquirer is publicly traded, the acquirer's shareholders have no appraisal
rights, and if the target is publicly traded, its shareholders have no
appraisal rights if, inter alia, the consideration they received is stock of
the acquirer.99
There is no market out exception under the Revised Model Busi-
96. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 251(f) (1991).
97. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 11.03 (1984).
98. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200, 1201 (Deering 1997).
99. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(b)(2)(a) (1991).
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ness Corporation Act. Consequently, the shareholders of the target have
the right to dissent in all events, °00 and, if the shareholders of the
acquirer have the right to vote, they also have the right to dissent. 1 1
California has a market-out exception, which applies if the stock of
the corporation (either the target or acquirer) is publicly traded and less
than 5% of the shareholders demand appraisal.'0 2
3. REVERSE TRIANGULAR MERGER
In a reverse triangular merger under Delaware law, the target's
shareholders have the right to vote in all events. The same is true under
section 11.03 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and sec-
tion 1201 of the California Corporations Code.
Under Delaware law, the shareholders of the acquirer do not have
the right to vote because the acquirer is not a "constituent" corporation
under section 251(c). The same is true under section 11.03 of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act because the acquirer is not a
"party to the merger." However, under sections 1200 and 1201 of the
California Code, the acquirer's shareholders have the right to vote,
unless the consideration paid by the acquirer is its voting stock amount-
ing to more than 20% of its voting stock before the transaction. Thus, if
the consideration paid by the acquirer is cash, the acquirer's sharehold-
ers have no vote. Also, they have no vote if the acquirer issues its vot-
ing stock in the merger and such voting stock is less than 20% of the
acquirer's voting stock immediately before the transaction.
Even though under Delaware law and the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act the shareholders of the acquiring parent do not have the
right to vote in a triangular merger, if the acquiring parent is publicly-
traded then the shareholders are given the right to vote under the rules of
the New York Stock Exchange, 0 3 the American Stock Exchange, l0" or
the National Association of Securities Dealers,"°5 whichever is applica-
ble, if the acquiring parent issues its stock in the merger amounting to
more than 20% of its outstanding stock immediately before the merger.
Under section 262 of Delaware law, the target's shareholders have
the right to dissent, unless the target is publicly traded and in the merger
the target's shareholders receive publicly traded stock of the acquirer.106
100. See REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (1984).
101. See id. § 13.02.
102. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1300(b)(1) (Deering 1997).
103. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE MANUAL § 312.00.
104. See AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE MANUAL § 712.
105. See NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS (NASD) MANUAL, SCHEDULE D TO BYLAWS,
§ 5(i).
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(b)(2)b (1991).
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Since the acquirer's shareholder do not have the right to vote under Del-
aware law (even if they have the right to vote under an exchange rule),
they do not have a right to dissent under section 262.
Under section 13.02 of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act, the shareholders of the target have the right to dissent in all events,
and since the acquiring parent's shareholders do not have the right to
vote (even though they may have a right to vote under an exchange
rule), they do not have the right to dissent.
Under section 1300 of California law, the target's shareholders
have the right to dissent, unless the target's shares as publicly traded,
and less that 5% of the of the target's shareholders' dissent. Also, if the
acquirer's shareholders have the right to vote under section 1201, they
have the right to dissent under section 1300, unless the acquirer's shares
are publicly traded and less than 5% of its shareholders' dissent.
E. Purchase and Sale of a Controlling Stock Interest
The purchase or sale of a controlling stock interest can give rise to
such issues as (1) whether a control premium received by the selling
stockholder must be shared with the non-selling shareholders, (2)
whether the selling shareholders are liable if the purchaser loots the
company, and (3) whether the non-selling shareholders have any rights
under the Federal securities laws? °7 The answers to these questions are
generally: (1) no, the control premium does not have to be shared; 18 (2)
maybe, the selling shareholders may be liable for sale to a known looter
if the selling shareholder failed to properly investigate; 19 and (3) no, the
nonselling shareholders have no rights under Rule I0b-5 because they
are not purchasers or sellers."I0
VI. FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW IssuEs IN NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS
A. Introduction
This section deals with the following issues that can arise under the
federal securities laws in the acquisition of a publicly held target corpo-
ration in a negotiated acquisition.
107. For a general discussion of these issues, see KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra
note 1, at section 4.11; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 11.
108. See, e.g., Zetlin v. Hanson Holding, Inc. 48 N.Y.2d 684 (N.Y. 1979).
109. See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 29 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). But see Swinney v.
Keebler, 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).
110. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Marion Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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B. Preparation of the Proxy Statement and Registration Statement
Under the Federal Securities Law
If a publicly traded target that is subject to registration under the 34
Act' is to be acquired in a merger, a proxy statement will have to be
prepared in accordance with Rules 14a-1 and Schedule 14A under the 34
Act. If a publicly traded acquirer is issuing in the merger stock amount-
ing to 20% or more of its outstanding stock before the merger, the
acquirer's shareholders will have the right to vote under state law or
under the exchange voting rule or both, and consequently, a proxy state-
ment will have to be prepared for the acquirer's shareholders. In addi-
tion, since the acquirer is issuing stock in the acquisition of a public
target, the acquirer is required by Rule 145 under the 33 Act to register
the stock. Thus, this type of acquisition of a publicly held target by a
publicly held acquirer involves the preparation of two proxy statements
under section 14 of the 34 Act and one registration statement under the
33 Act. These proxy statements and the registration statement can be
jointly filed on Form S-4,12 and the disclosure document that is distrib-
uted to shareholders will be a joint acquirer and target proxy statement
and acquirer prospectus." I3
Rule 145(b) sets forth the information that can be included in a
press release announcing the deal prior to the filing of the S-4 registra-
tion statement without engaging in gun jumping under section 5 of the
33 Act. Rule 145(c) and (d) deal with the resale of registered securities
received in a Rule 145 transaction. Basically a target shareholder that is
not an affiliate can sell without restriction, but there are limitations on
the ability of an affiliate to resell.
Rule 14a-9 of the proxy rules is a general antifraud provision simi-
lar to Rule lOb-5, and shareholders have a private right of action to
enforce the rule." 4 The standard for determining whether an inaccuracy
in a proxy statement is "material" and, therefore, actionable is governed
by the Supreme Court's decision in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.,"'5 where the Court held that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is
a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote.""' 6
111. The reference hereinafter to a publicly traded corporation is to a corporation which is
required to register under section 12(g) of the 34 Act, which applies to corporations with 500
shareholders and $10 million in assets. See Rule 12g-1.
112. See General Instruction E of Form S-4.
113. See, e.g., KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITION, supra note 1, at § 5.02; THOMPSON,
BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at § 13.10.
114. See J.1. Case Company v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
115. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
116. Id. at 439.
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The circuit courts are split on the question of whether scienter is a
requirement under Rule 14a-9."17 In Virginia Bankshares, Inc., v.
Sandberg," I 8 the Supreme Court held that in order to be actionable under
Rule 14a-9, a proxy statement must be an "essential link" in the accom-
plishment of the merger.
Under Delaware law a party issuing a proxy statement has a duty of
candor' 1 9 with respect to all material facts, and the test for materiality is
the same as the test under Federal law.'
20
C. The Plain English Initiative
In his article in this Symposium entitled Plain English-Changing
the Corporate Culture,'21 Securities Exchange Commissioner Isaac C.
Hunt, Jr. addresses the SEC's plain English initiative and explains that
the SEC is seeking comments on its proposed Plain English Handbook,
which has recently been released. Commissioner Hunt emphasizes that
it is particularly important that proxy statements for mergers and acqui-
sitions be written in plain English, and he applauded the lawyers who
drafted the proxy statement in the Bell/NYNEX merger for their success
in drafting that major document in plain English. He also addresses the
question of whether compliance with the plain English rule will subject
issuers to greater liability and concluded that this will not be the case. In
this regard, he says that he knows of "no case that has held anyone liable
for clearly and accurately disclosing material information to
investors." 2
2
D. Disclosure of Merger Negotiations
Under the rules of Basic v. Levinson 23 and In re The Matter of
Carnation Company,124 if a company chooses to make a disclosure con-
cerning a merger negotiation, the company must speak truthfully,
assuming the subject matter of the disclosure is material. In determining
whether merger negotiations are material, Basic applies a probability-
magnitude test. The best practice for a company to follow in responding
117. Compare Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (only
negligence required), with Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1976)
(scienter required).
118. 501 U.S. 1083 (1991).
119. See, e.g., In re Genetech, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,317
(Del. Ch. 1990).
120. See, e.g., Zirn v. VLI Corporation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,722 (Del. 1993).
121. Hunt, Plain English, supra note 11.
122. Id. at 717.
123. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
124. Exchange Act Rel. No. 22214 (July 8, 1985).
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to inquires about possible mergers is to respond with "no comment.' 25
E. Impact of Section 16(b)
Liability under section 16(b) under the 34 Act for certain 10%
shareholders may arise in a takeover context if, for example, a potential
acquirer who after exceeding the 10% threshold buys and sells within
six months. If, however, the potential acquirer has its stock in the
acquirer converted to merger consideration as a result of the acquisition
by another party of the target, the transaction should be exempt from
section 16(b) liability as an unorthodox transaction under Kern County
Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.t26 This exception does not
apply if the potential acquirer sells the target's stock back to the
target. 2
7
VII. FEDERAL INCOME TAX AND ACCOUNTING ASPECTS OF MERGERS
AND ACQuISITIONS
A. Introduction
This section briefly outlines the tax and accounting treatment of
certain basic acquisition transactions. 28  Also, the section briefly
addresses some of the tax and non-tax aspects of spinoffs.' 29
This section focuses on the tax and accounting aspects of the seven
transactions set out in the following three paragraphs:
(1) Mergers. The acquisition of a target in a merger of the target
into the acquirer (i.e., a direct merger), or in a merger of a subsidiary of
the acquirer (acquiring sub) into the target (i.e., a reverse subsidiary
merger), or in a merger of the target into acquiring subsidiary (i.e., a
forward subsidiary merger).
(2) Stock Acquisitions. An acquisition by an acquirer of all of the
stock of a target (i.e., a direct stock acquisition), or an acquisition by
125. See generally KLING, Negotiated Acquisitions, supra note 1, at ch. 7; THOMPSON,
BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at § 13.7.
126. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
127. See Colan v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 941 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1991). For a general discussion
of section 16(b) in the merger and acquisition context see KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS,
supra note 1, at § 5.03[4]; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at § 13.16.
128. See generally MARTIN GINSBURG & JACK LEVIN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS
(1995); BORRIS BITrKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS (6th ed. (1994)); SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., TAXABLE AND TAX-FREE
CORPORATE MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND LBOs (1994); KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS,
supra note 1, at ch. 3; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at chs. 5 (tax), 6
(accounting).
129. See generally THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 25
(spinoffs).
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acquiring subsidiary of all of the stock of target (a triangular stock
acquisition).
(3) Asset Acquisitions. An acquisition of substantially all of the
assets of a target (i.e., a direct asset acquisition), or the acquisition by
acquiring subsidiary of substantially all of target's assets (i.e., a triangu-
lar asset acquisition), with the target liquidating in both cases.
To summarize the seven transactions are: (1) a direct merger, (2) a
reverse subsidiary merger, (3) a forward subsidiary merger, (4) a direct
stock acquisition, (5) a triangular stock acquisition, (6) a direct asset
acquisition, and (7) a triangular asset acquisition. In each transaction the
consideration used is in the alternative cash and voting stock of the
acquirer, and the target is in the alternative a stand alone corporation,
(i.e., not a subsidiary) and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the target's
parent (target parent).
The fact patterns involved in an acquisition are unlimited, but many
of the tax and accounting principles can be illustrated by these seven
transactions.
Each of these seven transactions can be structured either as a reor-
ganization under section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) in
which case the parties will receive tax-free or partially tax-free treat-
ment130 or the transaction can be structured as a taxable acquisition. The
first question to ask is whether the transaction constitutes a reorganiza-
tion under section 368, because if it does not constitute a reorganization,
the transaction will be taxable.
Each of the above transactions will be treated for accounting pur-
poses as either a pooling of interest or a purchase, and the acquirer will
have one consolidated balance sheet even if after the acquisition the tar-
get is held as a subsidiary. In a pooling, the historic balance sheets and
income statements of the acquirer and target are merely added up and in
a purchase the assets and liabilities of the target are included on the
acquirer's balance sheet at fair market value and the acquirer's income
statement reflects these new amounts.
To qualify as a pooling, the transaction must satisfy all of the con-
ditions of Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 16 (APB Opinion
No. 16.), otherwise the transaction is treated as a purchase.
To qualify as a pooling, the transaction must satisfy three broad sets
of requirements. First, under paragraph 46 of APB Opinion No. 16,
relating to the characteristics of the Combining Companies, the compa-
nies must be autonomous (i.e., not a subsidiary) and independent (i.e.,
no intercorporate investment in excess of 10%). Second, under para-
130. See I.R.C. §§ 354-62 (1994).
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graph 47, relating to the Combining Interest, (1) the combination must
be effectuated in a single transaction, (2) 90% of the consideration paid
must be underlying voting common stock of the acquirer and any non-
voting stock consideration must not be distributed pro rata, (3) repur-
chases of shares by both companies are restricted, (4) the shareholders of
the two companies must maintain the same proportionate interest, (5)
voting rights must be unrestricted, and (6) no contingent consideration
can be used. Third, under paragraph 48, relating to an Absence of
Planned Transactions, (1) there can be so changes in the common stock
issued, (2) there can be no side deals with shareholders, and (3) the
acquirer cannot make any significant disposition.
In addition to the above rules, the SEC also requires as a condition
of pooling that there be "risk-sharing." This requires that "no affiliate of
either company reduces his risk relative to any common shares received
in the business combination until publication of financial results cover-
ing at least thirty days of post-merger combined operations." '1 3' Also, in
1996 the SEC ruled that the intention by. an acquirer to reacquire treas-
ury stock after the acquisition precludes accounting for the combination
as a pooling. 132
If the transaction is treated as a purchase, then under Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 17 (APB Opinion No. 17), any goodwill
arising from the acquisition of the target's assets must be written-off
over a period of not more than 40 years.
B. The Direct Merger
1. TAX TREATMENT. THE (A) REORGANIZATION
The direct merger of a stand-alone target into the acquirer with the
target's shareholders receiving stock of the acquirer will constitute a
reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(A) of the Code, provided the
continuity of interest requirement is satisfied (i.e., a minimum amount of
the consideration must be stock and the stock received is not immedi-
ately resold), the continuity of business enterprise requirement is satis-
fied (i.e., the target's business or a substantial portion thereof is
continued), and there is a business purpose for the transaction. This is
referred to as an A reorganization. The stock consideration in a direct
merger could be as low as 40% (for IRS ruling purposes, 50%),133 and
the transaction could still qualify as an A reorganization; however, the
target's shareholders who receive non-stock consideration (i.e., boot)
will be subject to tax.
131. SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN Topic 2: BUSINESS COMBINATIONS (1996).
132. See SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN, No. 96 (Mar. 19, 1996).
133. See Revenue Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 569, § 3.02.
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If the target is a subsidiary, the target parent will not be able to
distribute the acquirer stock it receives in the merger to its shareholders
in a tax-free transaction. Thus, to avoid tax, the target parent would
have to continue to own the acquirer's stock. In any event, subsidiaries
are generally not acquired in a merger transaction. Rather, subsidiaries
are generally acquired in either a stock purchase as discussed in Section
VII.E. or in an asset acquisition as discussed in section VII.G.
If the consideration is all cash, the merger will be treated as a taxa-
ble sale by target of its assets to acquirer followed by a taxable liquidat-
ing distribution of the cash to the target's shareholders. Thus, there
would be a double tax, one at the target level and one at the shareholder
level.' 34 In most cases the parties will want to avoid this result.
2. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
If the consideration paid in the merger is at least 90% voting stock
of the acquirer and any boot is not distributed pro-rata to the target's
shareholders (i.e., the 90% voting stock requirement), and the other con-
ditions for a pooling are satisfied, the transaction will be treated as a
pooling of interests for accounting purposes.' 35 Otherwise, the transac-
tion will be accounted for as a purchase.
If target is a subsidiary the transaction cannot be accounted for as a
pooling because one of the conditions for a pooling is that the target be
autonomous, that is, not a subsidiary.136
C. The Reverse Subsidiary Merger
1. TAX TREATMENT
The reverse subsidiary merger of an acquiring subsidiary into a
stand-alone target, with the target's shareholders receiving stock of the
acquirer will be treated as a reorganization under section 369(a)(2)(E),
provided (1) the consideration is at least 80% voting stock of acquirer,
(2) the continuity of interest requirement is otherwise satisfied, (3) the
continuity of business enterprises requirement is satisfied, and (4) there
is a business purpose for the transaction. Conditions (2) through (4) are
hereinafter referred to as the "other reorganization conditions."
If cash is the consideration in the merger, the transaction will be
treated as a taxable acquisition of the target's stock.' 37 The target is not
subject to tax, unless an election under section 338 is filed as discussed
below in Section VII.E. Since the reverse subsidiary cash merger pro-
134. See, e.g., West Shore Fuel, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1979).
135. See APB Opinion No. 16, IN 45-49.
136. See id. at I 46(a).
137. See Rev. Rul. 90-95, 1990-2 C.B. 67.
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duces only one level of tax and the target's assets and liabilities stay
within the target, which becomes a subsidiary of the acquirer, this is one
of the preferred forms of taxable acquisition.
2. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
If the consideration paid in the merger satisfies the 90% voting
stock requirement, the transaction will be treated as a pooling. Other-
wise it will be treated as a purchase.
D. Forward Subsidiary Merger
1. TAX TREATMENT
The forward subsidiary merger of a stand-alone target into an
acquiring subsidiary, with the target's shareholders receiving stock of
the acquirer will be treated as a reorganization under section
368(a)(2)(D), provided (1) the consideration paid is at least 40% (50%
for IRS ruling purposes) stock of the acquirer, 3 ' and (2) the other reor-
ganization conditions are satisfied.
If the consideration is cash or the merger does not otherwise qualify
as a reorganization, the transaction is treated as a taxable purchase of the
target's assets followed by a taxable acquisition of the stock of the tar-
get's shareholders. 139 This generally should be avoided.
2. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
If the consideration paid in the merger satisfies the 90% voting
stock requirement, the transaction will be treated as a pooling. Other-
wise, it will be treated as a purchase. Thus, for example, if the consider-
ation paid is 50% stock of the acquirer, the transaction will be a
reorganization for tax purposes but a purchase for accounting purposes.
E. Direct Stock Acquisition
1. TAX TREATMENT. THE (B) REORGANIZATION
The acquisition of the target's shares directly from the target's
shareholders in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquirer will be
treated as a reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(B), provided (1) the
acquirer acquires at least 80% of the target's stock, and (2) the other
reorganization conditions are satisfied. There can be no boot considera-
tion. This is referred to as the B reorganization.
If the acquisition is for cash or the acquisition does not otherwise
138. Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 569, § 3.02.
139. See, e.g., West Shore Fuel, Inc. v. United States, 598 F.2d 1236 (2d Cir. 1979).
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qualify as a reorganization, the transaction is treated as a taxable
purchase of the target's stock and the target is not subject to tax, unless a
section 338 election is made to treat the target as if it sold and then
repurchased its assets. A section 338 election generally will not be filed
because the parties will want to avoid a tax at the target level. The
taxable stock acquisition is the preferred form of taxable acquisition.
If the target is a subsidiary, and the stock acquisition is taxable (i.e.,
not a B reorganization), the target parent and the acquirer may jointly
file a section 338 election. In such case, the target parent is subject to
only one level of tax. A joint section 338 election is generally filed in a
stock acquisition of a subsidiary, because the target gets a stepped-up
basis and the target parent is only subject to one level of tax, which
would also be the case even if the parent did not join in filing under
section 338.
2. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
In the acquisition of a stand-alone target, if the consideration paid
satisfies the 90% voting stock requirement, the transaction will be
treated as a pooling. Otherwise the transaction will be treated as a
purchase.
To qualify as a reorganization for tax purposes, the consideration
must be solely voting stock. Thus, for example, if the consideration paid
by the acquirer is 90% voting stock and 10% cash the transaction will be
taxable, but as long as the cash is not distributed pro rata, the transaction
will be treated as a pooling for accounting purposes.
F. Triangular Stock Acquisition
The results are essentially the same as in the direct stock acquisi-
tion, except the acquirer is the acquiring subsidiary.
G. Direct Asset Acquisition
1. TAX TREATMENT. THE (C) REORGANIZATION
The acquisition by acquirer of substantially all of the target's assets
in exchange solely for voting stock of the acquirer will be treated as a
reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(C), provided the target is liqui-
dated and the other reorganization requirements are satisfied. This is
referred to as a C reorganization. In certain cases, acquirer may be able
to pay up to 20% boot.
If the acquisition is for cash (or the transaction does not otherwise
qualify as a reorganization) and the target is liquidated, there will be two
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levels of tax on the transaction.' 4 ° Normally this should be avoided,
unless the target has net operating losses or is an S corporation.
If the target is a subsidiary, the asset acquisition will produce one
level of tax for the target parent because the subsequent liquidation of
the target will be tax-free to the parent under section 332.
2. ACCOUNTING TREATMENT
In the acquisition of the assets of a stand-alone target, if the consid-
eration paid satisfies the 90% voting stock requirement and the target is
liquidated, the transaction will be treated as a pooling. Otherwise, the
transaction will be treated as a purchase.
H. Triangular Asset Acquisition
The results are essentially the same as in the direct asset acquisi-
tion, except the acquirer is the acquiring subsidiary.
I. Possible Use of Section 351
If an acquisition cannot qualify as a reorganization, it may still be
possible to give some of the target's shareholders tax-free treatment
through the use of section 351. For example, assume that individual A
owns 15% of the stock of a target company, and the public owns the
balance of target's stock. Acquiring corporation wants to acquire target
in a transaction in which A receives tax-free treatment and the public
shareholders of target receive cash. Acquirer and A jointly form a hold-
ing company (HQ with acquirer contributing cash in an amount equal to
the purchase price of the target stock held by the public and A contribut-
ing his 15% stock interest. Acquirer receives 85% of HC's stock and A
receives 15%. HC then forms a subsidiary and transfers the cash to the
subsidiary. The subsidiary merges into target in a reverse subsidiary
merger in which target's public shareholders receive cash for their
shares and target becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of acquirer. The
Internal Revenue Service has ruled that the formation of HC is a tax-free
transaction to A under section 351 even though 85% of the stock of the
target is acquired for cash. I4'
J. Spinoffs
Spinoffs are transactions in which a parent corporation distributes
the stock of a subsidiary to the parent's shareholders. If certain condi-
tions set out in Code section 355 are satisfied, spinoffs can be effectu-
140. See id.
141. See Rev. Rul. 84-71, 1984-2 C.B. 106.
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ated on a tax-free basis to both the distributing corporation and its
shareholders.' 42
In general, to qualify under section 355, both the distributing corpo-
ration and the subsidiary that is spun off must hold active businesses that
have been conducted for at least five years, the distributing corporation
must distribute at least 80% of the subsidiary's stock, there must be a
good business purpose for the transaction, and the distribution cannot be
used as a device for the distribution of earning and profits. The subsidi-
ary can be either newly formed in a reorganization under section
368(a)(1)(D) or previously existing.
A spinoff may in certain cases precede an acquisitive reorganiza-
tion as was the situation in Commissioner v. Morris Trust.14 3 There a
target distributed to its shareholders the stock of an unwanted subsidiary,
and the target was then acquired in a stock merger. The court held that
the distribution qualified as a tax-free spinoff under section 355 and the
merger qualified as a tax-free reorganization. The Clinton administra-
tion has proposed legislation that would significantly restrict the ability
to structure Morris Trust type spinoffs followed by acquisitive
reorganizations.'
A host of non-tax issues can arise in a spinoff such as compliance
with the dividend provisions of the state business corporation law
because the spinoff is a distribution, and compliance with various SEC
rules even though a registration statement under the 33 Act is not
required.14 5
VIII. DUE DILIGENCE AND SELECTED RISK ISSUES
The due diligence investigation in a merger or acquisition will
begin during the process of the identification of the target and continue
through the closing of the acquisition agreement. 146 The purpose of the
due diligence investigation is to ensure that the acquirer has all relevant
and material information concerning the target. If the acquirer is issuing
stock, the target and its shareholders will conduct a similar due diligence
investigation of the acquirer.
One of the principal functions of the due diligence process is to
142. See generally THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 25..
143. 367.F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
144. See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, Description and Analysis of Certain Revenue-
Raising Provisions Contained in President Clinton's Fiscal 1998 Budget Proposal, prepared for
House Ways and Means Committee, § II.B.6. (JCX-10-97, Mar. 11, 1997).
145. See generally THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch'. 25.
146. See generally KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS, supra note 1, at ch. 8; SECTION OF
BUSINESS LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MANUAL ON ACQUISITION REVIEW (1995);
THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at § 15.17.
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identify the risk associated with the target. In the article in this Sympo-
sium entitled Selected Risk Issues In Merger and Acquisition Transac-
tions,'4 7 Howard Shecter addresses the following broad risk topics, (1)
successor product liability issues, (2) employee benefits issues, (3) envi-
ronmental issues, (4) labor and employment law issues, and (5) intellec-
tual property issues.
In addressing the issues of successor product liability, Mr. Shecter
first outlines the traditional rule which holds that an acquiring party is
only liable for the specific liabilities assumed in an asset acquisition. He
then discusses several cases that have rejected the traditional rule in
favor of imposing liability on the acquiring party. In Knapp v. North
American Rockwell Corp.,14 the court held that an acquiring corpora-
tion was liable under strict product liability principles for injury for a
defective product manufactured by the predecessor corporation. The
principle in Knapp was expanded in Ray v. Alad Corp.,149 where the
California court enunciated a product line exception to the general rule
of non-liability. Under this exception an acquiring person is liable if it
continues the line of products that were manufactured by the target.
This principle also has been adopted in New Jersey in Ramirez v.
Amsted Indus., Inc.'o
Mr. Shecter says that notwithstanding the liberal approach taken in
Knapp, Ray, and Ramirez, other states, such as Florida, 5' have not fol-
lowed along this line.
In a very important section of the paper entitled "Practical Sugges-
tions," '51 Mr. Shecter discusses practical ways of dealing with the possi-
bility of successor product liability. First, he suggests that where there is
a risk of successor liability, the acquisition may be made by a special
subsidiary that is well capitalized to avoid piercing of the corporate veil.
Second, the acquirer may seek a "sleep easy" insurance policy which
would protect its investment against potential loss associated with defec-
tive products manufactured by the target corporation.
With regard to employee benefit plans, the acquirer must first
ascertain the legal exposure to which it may become subject by reason of
the purchase and then assess the financial risk associated with the plans
that have been identified. The parties should negotiate regarding who
will bear the cost and risk associated with any of the plans. He sets out
sample representations of warranties relating to benefit plans.
147. Shecter, Selected Risk Issues, supra note 12.
148. 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975).
149. 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).
150. 431 A.2d 811 (N.J. 1981).
151. See Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. 1982).
152. Shecter, Selected Risk Issues, supra note 12, at 736-40.
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Turning to environmental issues, Mr. Shecter points out that there
are two types of environmental problems: first, problems arising from a
target's current operation, and second, problems resulting from prior
releases of hazardous or toxic materials. Mr. Shecter indicates that, in
general, environmental liabilities may not be avoided even in asset
acquisitions because the courts may apply a successor liability rule, such
as the "substantial continuity" test which was adopted in B.F. Goodrich
v. Betkoski.'53 Mr. Shecter then discusses the importance of Phase I and
Phase II environmental investigations.
Turning to labor and employment law issues, Mr. Shecter deals
with three broad areas. First, he discusses the successor corporation's
obligation to give notice under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Act (WARN) of any planned plant closings, mass lay-offs or actual
employment terminations. Second, he addresses the applicability of the
"successorship doctrine," a judicially developed doctrine that effectively
transfers certain labor-related obligations from the target to the acquirer
if the employees are represented by a union. Here the initial inquiry is
to determine whether the acquirer is a "successor" under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which is a question that is to be answered
on a case by case basis. If the successorship doctrine applies, then the
acquirer has certain related duties, such as the duty to arbitrate and the
duty to bargain. Also, the successor may have liability for the predeces-
sor's unfair labor practices or civil rights violations.
Mr. Shecter then turns to the issue of the assignability of individual
employment agreements and covenants not to compete, and concludes
that the issue must be resolved by reference to the applicable state law.
The general rule, however, seems to be that such contracts are enforcea-
ble by a transferee, in the absence of a specific provision in the contract
providing otherwise.
The final topic addressed by Mr. Shecter deals with intellectual
property issues in acquisition transactions. He points out that this
should be a four-step process. First, the acquirer should evaluate the
intellectual property rights of the target through a proper due diligence
investigation. Second, the acquirer should take steps to correct any
defects in the intellectual property prior to closing. Third, the acquirer
should insure that it obtains valid title. Fourth, the acquirer should pro-
ceed to perfect that title.
The issues addressed by Mr. Shecter are just some of the many risk
issues that can arise in an acquisition. It is important that the acquirer
153. 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996).
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conduct a proper due diligence investigation to identify the specific risk
that the acquirer is undertaking.
In dealing with each of the risks addressed by Mr. Shecter, there
seems to be a fundamental four-step approach. First, the basic risk must
be identified; second, the particular risk must be properly investigated to
ascertain the scope of the risk; third, steps must be taken to minimize the
risk; and fourth, the parties must negotiate over who will bear the ulti-
mate risk assuming that the risk is not eliminated.
IX. DRAFTING THE ACQUISITION AGREEMENT AND THE TREATMENT
OF FIDUCIARY OUTS
Lou Kling and his co-authors provide a guide to the drafting of
acquisition agreements in their article entitled, Summary of Acquisition
Agreements. 54 In his article entitled Merger Agreements Under Dela-
ware Law-When Can Directors Change Their Minds?'5 5 Gil Sparks
addresses the difficult question of whether the target's directors have the
right to walk from an acquisition agreement that they no longer like.
As Lou Kling and his co-authors point out, there is usually a gap
between the signing of an acquisition agreement and the closing. 56 In
addition to addressing the stock or assets to be sold and the considera-
tion to be paid, the typical acquisition agreement will contain (1) repre-
sentations and warranties of the parties dealing with the state of the
parties as of the signing,'57 (2) covenants dealing with the conduct of
matters between the signing and the closing, 58 (3) conditions dealing
with the preconditions to the obligation of each party to close, 5 9 and (4)
termination provisions dealing with the rights of the parties to walk from
the transaction. 60
These various provisions are inter-related. For example, the "bring
down" in the conditions portion of the agreement will generally require
that a party's representations and warranties be true and correct at the
time of signing as well as at the time of the closing.' 6' Acquisition
agreements involving the acquisition of privately-held corporations, sub-
sidiaries or divisions may also contain indemnification provisions, pur-
154. Kling, Acquisition Agreements, supra note 13. See generally KLING, NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS, supra note 1, at chs. 10-15; MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT, supra note 2;
THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, supra note 1, at ch. 15.
155. Sparks, Fiduciary Outs, supra note 14.
156. KLING, Acquisition Agreements, supra note 13, at Part 11.
157. See id. at Parts III, IV.
158. See id. at Part VI.
159. See id. at Part VII.
160. See id. at Part IX.
161. See id. at Part Ii.
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suant to which the parties agree to indemnify each other if it turns out
that a party's representations and warranties are untrue. Thus, in a pri-
vate deal, the representations and warranties generally survive the clos-
ing, whereas in a public acquisition they generally do not survive.
In drafting the representations and warranties, care must be given to
the structuring of "knowledge" and "materiality" qualifications. 62 The
parties should be cognizant of the possibility of double materiality,
which can arise when a representation and warranty that is subject to a
materiality qualification is again materially qualified in the conditions to
closing. 163 As explained by Lou Kling, double materiality occurs quite
often in public deals.' 64
Mr. Kling also discusses acquisitions of publicly-held firms and
indicates that many such transactions may involve multiple steps, such
as a purchase of stock from a major shareholder, followed by a tender
offer and then a second step freeze-out merger. 165
In addition, the authors discuss acquisition agreements for LBOs
and the importance of a representation concerning the solvency of the
target in order to avoid a fraudulent transfer. 166 In this regard, consider-
ation should be given to Munford Inc. v. Valuation Research Corpora-
tion.167 There the court implicitly found that even though there was a
solvency representation in the LBO merger agreement, a fraudulent con-
veyance may have occurred. Also, in another case dealing with the
same transaction, the court held that under the Georgia Business Corpo-
ration Law, an LBO was a distribution. This could expose the target's
directors to personal liability if the distribution was illegal because the
target was insolvent. 68
These are just some of the issues that can arise in drafting an acqui-
sition agreement.
Finally, in his article dealing with the ability of a target's board to
walk from a transaction, Gil Sparks demonstrates that the law in this
area is unsettled and that the parties need to give close consideration to
the preparation of fiduciary-outs provisions of an acquisition agreement.
In particular, attention should be given to Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 16 9 which held that a merger agreement did
162. See id. at Part IV.
163. See id. at Part IV.B.
164. See id.
165. See id. at Part XI.A.
166. For a discussion of LBOs see KLING, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITION, supra note 1, at ch. 20;
THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 14.
167. 98 F.3d 604 (11 th Cir. 1996).
168. See In re Munford Inc. v. Valuation Research Corporation, 97 F.3d 456 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
169. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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not create "vested rights" in the acquirer and that under the circum-
stances the target's directors had an obligation to consider other offers.
X. OUTLINE OF IMPACT OF WILLIAMS ACT PROVISIONS
OF THE 34 ACT
This section briefly outlines the Williams Act provisions of the 34
Act, which are principally contained in sections 13(d) and (e) and 14(d)
and (e).17° These provisions govern certain wanted and unwanted accu-
mulations of the stock of publicly traded targets.
Section 13(d) deals with open market purchases of the stock of a
publicly held corporation. Section 13(e) authorizes the SEC to promul-
gate rules governing the purchase of the stock of a publicly held corpo-
ration by such corporation or an affiliate. Under this provision, the SEC
has promulgated Rule 13e-3, which deals with certain going private
transactions and Rule 13e-4, which deals with issuer tender offers.
Section 14(d) deals with third party tender offers and section 14(e)
prohibits certain fraudulent acts or nondisclosures in connection with a
tender offer. The SEC has promulgated an elaborate set of rules under
sections 14(d) and (e). These provisions are also addressed on a com-
parative basis in section XI and in Ed Greene's article on international
acquisitions. 7'
Under section 13(d), if a person or group acquires more than 5% of
the stock of a publicly held corporation, such person or group is required
to file a Schedule 13-D within ten days of crossing the 5% threshold.
This schedule requires certain information, including the reasons for the
acquisition. The purpose of section 13(d) is to apprise the market of any
significant purchases of a publicly held corporation's shares.
The rules under sections 14(d) and (e) set out a variety of require-
ments relating to a tender offer. Most of the rules govern the bidder, but
some rules also govern the target and trading by investors in the shares
of the target. Rules 14d-1 through 14d-6 and Schedule 14-D set out
elaborate disclosure rules for tender offers. Also, under Rule 14e-1 (a), a
tender offer must remain open for at least twenty business days. Rule
14d-7 allows a tendering shareholder to withdraw any tendered securi-
ties during the period the tender offer remains open. Under Rule 14d-8,
if a partial tender offer is over subscribed, the shares must be purchased
on a pro rata basis. Under the all holders, best price provisions of Rule
14d-10, a tender offer must be open to all shareholders of the class of
170. See generally KLING, NEGOTIATED AcQUISITIONS, supra note 1, at § 5.03[3]; LIProN,
TAKEOVERS, supra note 1; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at chs. 16-
21, 24.
171. See Greene, Cross Border Takeover Regulations, supra note 15.
[Vol. 51:533
1997] SYMPOSIUM GUIDE TO MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 575
shares subject to the tender offer, and the consideration paid to any
shareholder must be the highest consideration paid in the tender offer.
Also, Rule l0b-13 prohibits the bidder from purchasing any of the tar-
get's shares outside of the tender offer.
Rule 14e-2 requires the target's board to advise the target's share-
holders of the position the board takes on the tender offer. This require-
ment is implemented by Rule 14d-9 and Schedule 14D-9.
Turning to investors, Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading in the stock of a
target of a tender offer on the basis of material non-public information.
Although several courts have found that the SEC has the authority to
issue the rule,1 72 the Eighth Circuit found that the rule is beyond the
scope of the SEC's authority in United States v. O'Hagan.173
XI. INTERNATIONAL ACQUISITIONS
The level of cross border merger and acquisition activity has been
increasing dramatically. 74 From the U.S. perspective this activity may
be divided into inbound transactions in which a foreign acquirer acquires
a U.S. target and outbound activity in which a U.S. acquirer acquires a
foreign target. 75
The principal concern of U.S. lawyers involved in inbound transac-
tions will be compliance with various U.S. corporate, securities, tax,
antitrust, and other laws such as the Exon-Florio Act, which authorizes
the President to block the acquisition by a foreign person of a U.S. target
if the acquisition could have an adverse effect on national security.' 7 6
In outbound transactions, the U.S. lawyer will also help guide the
client through the maze of foreign laws that the U.S. acquirer will face
in the applicable foreign country. This could include, for example, anti-
trust enforcement in the European Community under its Merger Control
Regulation. 77
Obviously, international acquisitions can provide a number of chal-
lenging legal issues and in their article in this Symposium entitled
Toward a Cohesive International Approach to Cross Border Takeover
Regulation,78 Ed Greene and his co-authors address the absence of a
"consistent and cohesive" approach to the regulation of mergers and
acquisitions in which "(i) the bidder and target are each organized under
172. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Commission v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1997).
173. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), cert granted, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
174. See generally, Greene, Cross Border Takeover Regulation, supra note 15, at Part 1.
175. See generally THOMPSON, BUSxNESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at ch. 26, which
provides an introduction to international acquisitions.
176. See id. at ch. 26, Part II.
177. See id. Part I1.
178. Greene, Cross-Border Takeover Regulations, supra note 15.
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the laws of different countries and/or (ii) the target's shareholders are
located in more that one country."'' 79 The authors first review the back-
ground of this problem and of various policy responses such as the
SEC's 1991 International Tender Offer Proposal 8 ' and the European
Community's proposed Directive 13 on Takeover Bids.' 8' The authors
then set forth a proposal for SEC action to minimize tension between
U.S. takeover rules and those of other countries with a view to eliminat-
ing the strong incentive for parties making a tender offer for a foreign
target to exclude the target's U.S. shareholders from the tender offer. 82
The authors also propose an international accord on takeover regulation.
Their proposal is based on the assumption that the regulatory approach
should be similar to that in the United Kingdom, which through its City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers'83 is administered by the Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers, which consists of market participants who rely
on the threat of non-legal sanctions for enforcement purposes. The City
Code sets out ten general principles governing takeover bids. 84 One of
the principles requires that all shareholders of the same class be treated
the same, which is similar to the general approach of the Williams
Act.' 85 Another principle requires that the target's directors take no
action to frustrate an offer unless they get the approval of the target's
shareholders, which is inconsistent with the general approach of state
law in the U.S.' 86
The authors also specifically propose that cash-only tender offers
be regulated based on the tender offer rules in the target's country of
organizations, and they address the problem with cross border exchange
offers.
In addition to discussing the operation of City Code, the authors
also discuss the statutory approach to takeover regulation in France and
the non-statutory approach followed in Germany. 8 7 They illustrate how
179. Id. at 824 n.l.
180. See International Tender and Exchange Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-29275,
available in 1991 SEC Lexis 1026, at *4 (June 5, 1991) [hereinafter SEC International Tender
Offer Proposal].
181. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A 13TH EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE ON COMPANY LAW CONCERNING TAKEOVER BIDS, EUR.
PARL. Doc.(CoM 95) 655 (Feb. 2, 1996) [hereinafter EC Directive 13 on Takeover Bids]; see also
THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, which discusses the SEC Tender Offer
Proposal at § 26.12.B.2 and the EC Directive 13 on Takeover Bids at § 26.8.C.
182. Greene, Cross Border Takeover Regulation, supra note 15, at Part IV.
183. THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS and THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL
ACQUISITIONS OF SHARES (9th ed. 1996) [hereinafter CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS].
184. See Greene, Cross Border Takeover Regulation, supra note 15.
185. See id. at Part X.
186. See id. at Part II.
187. See Greene, Cross Border Takeover Regulation, supra note 15, at § II. See generally
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a tender offer by a French acquirer for the stock of a U.K. based target
with international shareholders may be subject to conflicting regulation
in France, the U.K., Germany, and the U.S. The conflicts arise with
respect to such items as (1) the requirement for the acquirer in certain
cases to make a mandatory offer, (2) the manner of commencing an
offer, (3) the minimum period during which an offer must remain open,
(4) withdrawal rights, (5) purchases outside the bid, (6) defensive tac-
tics, and (7) disclosure requirements."' 8 Under the mandatory offer pro-
visions of Rule 9.1 of the City Code, an acquirer cannot pass the 30%
ownership threshold without undertaking a bid for all of the target's
shares. Thus, partial tender offers cannot be made for more than 30% of
a target's stock.
The authors illustrate, inter alia, how conflicting regulation
between the U.K. and the U.S. regarding the all-holders, best price rule
under Rule 14d-10 was resolved by the SEC in Ford's 1989 tender offer
for Jaguar, a U.K. public limited company, which had a substantial
number of its shares traded through American Depository Shares in the
U.S.' 89 After examining these various approaches the authors conclude
that the different "regulatory systems have, while seeking what are
essentially similar protections, created incompatibilities that hinder
cross-border transactions."' 190
The authors next turn to a discussion of various proposals for reme-
dying this problem, including the SEC's 1990 Concept Release on Mul-
tinational Tender and Exchange Offers (the Multinational Concept
Release) 9' and the SEC's 1991 proposal on International Tender
Offers.' 92 The latter release proposed that if 10% or less of a non-U.S.
target's shares are held by U.S. persons, a cash tender offer made by an
acquirer would generally be exempt from the Williams Act. The propo-
THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1, at §§ 26.11 (French Statute), 26.10
(German Statute).
188. See id. at Part I.
189. See In re Ford Motor Company Limited Offer to Purchase the Ordinary Shares and
American Depositary Receipts of Jaguar PLC, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27425, available in
1989 SEC LEXIS 2346 (Oct. 18, 1991); see also In re Hanson PLC & HB Acquisitions PLC
Offers to Purchase the Ordinary Shares and American Depositary Receipts of Beazer P.L.C.,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-29835, available in 1991 SEC LEXIS 2346 (Oct. 18, 1991).
190. Greene, Cross Border Takeover Regulation, supra note 15, at 855.
191. Concept Release on Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers, SEC Release Nos. 33-
6866, 34-28093, available in 1990 SEC LEXIS 1139 (June 6, 1990). See Greene, Cross Border
Takeover Regulation, supra note 15, at Part 1I; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A,
supra note 1, at § 26.12.B.
192. SEC International Tender Offer Proposal, supra note 180. See Greene, Gross Border
Takeover Regulation, supra note 15, at Part II1; THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A,
supra note 1, and § 26.12.B.
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sal would not, however, exempt such transactions from the antifraud
provisions of Federal securities laws.
The authors also discuss suggestions in the International Tender
Offer Proposal for an exemption for international exchange offers in
which not more than $5 million of a foreign acquirer's securities are
offered in the U.S. and a simplified registration form for such exchange
offers where not more that 5% of a foreign target's shares are traded in
the U.S. 19 3 These proposals have not been adopted.
Further, the authors discuss the proposed EC Directive or Takeover
Bids, 194 which sets out certain general principles regarding takeovers
that are to apply throughout the European Union, such as a prohibition
on frustrating actions without shareholder approval and protection of
minority shareholders through mandatory bids. The authors explain that
the directive in essence sets out a residency test for determining which
member state should oversee a bid.
The authors finally propose that the SEC restart its efforts to
include U.S. shareholders in tender offers for non-U.S. targets and that
efforts be made through the International Organization of Securities
Councils (IOSCO) to develop minimum standards for takeover regula-
tion that participating countries would agree, through the use of the
"memorandum of understanding" (MOV) procedure, to follow.'9 5
They propose, inter alia, that the SEC adopt a presumption that any
tender offer for a class of securities of which more than 5% are held by
U.S. persons have "significant effects" in the U.S. and, therefore, are
subject to the Williams Act.' 9 6 They also propose that IOSCO establish
a working party to study international takeover regulations and to formu-
late a set of non-binding recommendations regarding such items as
methods for determining which country's rules apply in an international
tender offer. ' 97
XII. CONCLUSION
The merger and acquisition landscape is full of obstacles and pit-
falls. Hopefully, this Article and Symposium will assist the reader in
successfully traversing the field.
193. See Greene, Cross Border Takeover Regulations, supra note 15, at Part III.A. 1.
194. See id. at Part Ill.B; see also THOMPSON, BUSINESS PLANNING FOR M & A, supra note 1,
at § 26.8.C.
195. See id. at Part IV.
196. See id. at Part IVA.
197. See id. at Part IV.B.
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